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THE GRAVITATIONAL FORCE OF ORIGINALISM 
Randy E. Barnett* 
 
In Part I of this Article, I describe four aspects of the New Originalism:  
First, New Originalism is about identifying the original public meaning of 
the Constitution rather than the original Framers’ intent.  Second, the in-
terpretive activity of identifying the original public meaning of the text is a 
purely descriptive empirical inquiry.  Third, there is also a normative tenet 
of the New Originalism that contends that the original public meaning of 
the text should be followed.  Finally, distinguishing between the activities of 
interpretation and construction identifies the limit of the New Originalism, 
which is only a theory of interpretation.  In Part II, I then discuss how 
originalism can influence the outcome of such cases as District of Columbia 
v. Heller, McDonald v. City of Chicago, and National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).  I suggest that, so long as there are 
justices who accept the relevance of original meaning, originalism can ex-
ert a kind of “gravitational force” on legal doctrine even when, as in 
McDonald and NFIB, the original meaning of the Constitution appears not 
to be the basis of a judicial decision. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The New Originalism has made quite a splash since my article, An 
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, appeared in 1999.1  To a remarkable de-
gree, constitutional scholars in recent years, especially younger ones, have 
grasped its basic tenets, even if they do not find themselves in complete 
agreement with the approach.  In Part I of this Article, I summarize the 
main features of the New Originalism.  In Part II, I explain why originalism 
has proven to be significant in litigation, even in cases in which original 
meaning is not being debated or seems wholly irrelevant. 
I.  WHAT IS THE NEW ORIGINALISM? 
In this Part, I describe what is distinctive about the New Originalism.  
First, the New Originalism is about identifying the original public meaning 
of the Constitution and not the original Framers’ intent.  The New 
Originalism stands for the proposition that the meaning of a written consti-
tution should remain the same until it is properly changed.  Second, I ex-
plain that the interpretive activity of identifying the original public meaning 
of the text is an empirical inquiry.  Third, I discuss the normative justifica-
tion for following the original public meaning of the text.  Fourth, and final-
ly, I attempt to identify the limits of originalism by distinguishing two dis-
tinct activities:  first, the activity of “constitutional interpretation” that seeks 
to identify the communicative content of the text, and second, the activity 
of “constitutional construction” that seeks to supply the implementing rules 
and procedures by which this content can be applied to particular cases and 
controversies. 
A.  Original Public Meaning v. Original Framers’ Intent 
The old originalism purported to interpret the text of the Constitution ac-
cording to the intentions of its Framers.  This approach was subject to two 
objections that I, for one, found persuasive.  The first was the practical.  
How do you systematically identify what a diverse group of people thought 
about any particular issue?  As a result of this problem of “collective in-
tent,” and because new constitutional cases typically involved factual situa-
tions unknown to the Framers, old originalists typically engaged in a hypo-
thetical and counterfactual inquiry into how the Framers would have 
addressed an issue had they thought of it.  Back before I was an originalist, 
I called this “channeling the Framers”—as in, “Oh Framers, would you 
think the thermal imaging of a house to detect increased heat generated by 
marijuana cultivation is a ‘search’?”2 
The second concern was normative.  Why exactly should we the living, 
here today, be bound by the Framers’ intentions?  I called this the “Framers 
as wardens” model, but it was more commonly called the “dead hand” 
 
 1. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999). 
 2. See Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of Framers’ Intent, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 403, 405 (1996) (discussing “channeling the Framers”). 
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problem—as in, “What justification is there for us to be ruled by the dead 
hand of the past?”3  For these reasons, I, along with others, declined to be-
come an originalist. 
Then along came the New Originalism.4  Rather than attempt to identify 
some collective intentions of the Framers, the New Originalism looked to 
identify the original public meaning of the words of the text.  In other 
words, it seeks the meaning actually communicated to the public by the 
words on the page.  This is like the objective or “reasonable” meaning of a 
contract at the time of its formation.  Such an inquiry looks to three differ-
ent sources of communicative content of language. 
The first is the semantic meaning of the words on the page.5  For exam-
ple, what was the generally accepted meaning of the word “commerce” at 
the time of its enactment?  Did the word “arms” in the Second Amendment 
refer to weapons, or did it refer to the limbs to which our hands are at-
tached? 
Second, it looks to constitutional implicature, or what the semantic 
meaning of the Constitution implies in fact.6  For example, the Ninth 
Amendment says, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”7  
For the sake of argument, assume that the historical evidence establishes 
that the original sematic meaning of “rights . . . retained by the people” was 
natural (or “liberty” rights).8  Even so, the Ninth Amendment is literally just 
a rule of construction that expressly enjoins one, and only one, particular 
constitutional construction.  It enjoins any claim that, because some rights 
have been enumerated, another unenumerated right may be denied or dis-
paraged.  Or, to put it another way, a right that is not enumerated may not 
be denied or disparaged on the grounds that other rights were enumerated 
(by the way, I think this is exactly what footnote four of United States v. 
Carolene Products Co. does).9 
 
 3. Id. at 403–07 (describing the model of “Framers as wardens”). 
 4. The phrase “New Originalism” was coined by Keith Whittington, one of its principal 
architects. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 
(2004). 
 5. The scholar who did the most to stress the “semantic” aspect of originalism was 
Lawrence Solum. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of 
Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series, Paper No. 07-24, 2008), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244. 
 6. See Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assump-
tions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 620–22 (2009) (describing the communicative phenomenon 
of constitutional implicature). 
 7. Id. at 622–26 (explaining implicature in the context of the Ninth Amendment).  The 
next several paragraphs summarize the analysis presented there. 
 8. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty:  A Response to 
a Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937 (2008); Randy 
E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment:  It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2006) [herein-
after Barnett, The Ninth Amendment]. 
 9. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may 
be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation ap-
pears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the 
first ten amendments . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
414 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
The Ninth Amendment does not actually expressly state that there are 
“other rights” and that these other rights may not be denied or disparaged.10  
But the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment implies more than what 
it expressly says.  In particular, it implies, first, that there are rights that are 
retained by the people and, second, that these rights should not be denied or 
disparaged.  The rule of construction included in the Constitution would 
make no sense—and its presence in the first ten amendments would be in-
explicable—except on the assumption that there are rights retained by the 
people that ought not be denied or disparaged.  Taken together, then, these 
two implied propositions enjoin the denial or disparagement of natural 
rights, even where such a denial is not being justified on the grounds that 
other rights were enumerated.  This is the reason why so many who read the 
text of the Ninth Amendment think it is saying exactly this—because it is, 
just not expressly. 
Of course, such a meaning might have been communicated expressly ra-
ther than by implication.  To see how, consider the following provision that 
was proposed by Representative Roger Sherman as a member of the House 
Select Committee tasked with drafting amendments that became what we 
now call the Bill of Rights:  “The people have certain natural rights which 
are retained by them when they enter into Society. . . .  Of these rights 
therefore they Shall not be deprived by the Government of the united [sic] 
States.”11  Although Sherman’s proposal is not what the Ninth Amendment 
eventually said expressly, the words of the Amendment imply to a normal 
speaker of English both the existence of natural rights that are retained by 
the people and an injunction against the deprivation of those rights, while 
making a further point about how not to read the Bill of Rights.  In other 
words, Sherman’s proposal is part of the original—implied-in-fact—
meaning of the Ninth Amendment.  Or so I contend. 
Finally, to ascertain the original public meaning of the text, the New 
Originalism looks to the publicly available communicative context of these 
words to resolve problems of ambiguity.12  For example, when Article IV 
 
 10. In this sense, a more accurate, though less pithy, title for my Texas Law Review arti-
cle, Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 8, would have been, The Ninth Amendment:  
It Means What It Says Expressly and What It Implies in Fact.  The point of the concept of 
implicature is that one is really “saying” what is implicated, in the sense of actually com-
municating the unexpressed message. 
 11. Roger Sherman, Roger Sherman’s Draft of the Bill of Rights, in 1 THE RIGHTS 
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE:  THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 351, 351 
(Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).  The omitted portion of Sherman’s proposal (indicated by the 
ellipses) gave a nonexclusive list of examples of these individual natural “retained” rights: 
Such are the rights of Conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring property and 
of pursuing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing their Senti-
ments with decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling to consult their com-
mon good, and of applying to Government by petition or remonstrance for redress 
of grievances. 
Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 459 (2013) (“‘Public Meaning Originalism’ names the version of 
originalist theory holding that the communicative content of the constitutional text is fixed at 
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empowers the government of the United States to “protect . . . [every state] 
. . . against domestic Violence,”13 the publicly available context reveals this 
to be a reference to riots, not spousal abuse.  Publicly available context 
might also explain why, although the Constitution does not expressly refer-
ence slavery as a purely semantic matter, the public would know that the 
words “other persons” in the Three-Fifths Clause of Article I, Section 2 was 
a reference to slaves.14 
My first point about the New Originalism is that it seeks the original pub-
lic meaning of the text rather than the original Framers’ intent.  This means 
that the New Originalism is more practical than the old originalism insofar 
as it seeks to establish an empirical fact about the objective meaning of the 
text at a particular point in time, rather than a counterfactual reconstruction 
of the subjective intentions of an individual or group. 
B.  Originalism’s Descriptive Claim:  Identifying Original Public Meaning 
Is an Empirical Inquiry 
My second point about the New Originalism is that it seeks to discover 
an empirical fact about the world.15  Because we are so accustomed to 
thinking that our choice of interpretations is normative—which in a sense it 
is—it is important for me to stress that the New Originalism seeks to identi-
fy what a reasonable speaker of English would have understood the words 
of the text to mean at the time of its enactment.  This is as much an empiri-
cal inquiry as it would be to ascertain what the words I am now using mean 
today. 
When we choose to use language, the meaning of our words is deter-
mined by the social practice or convention that is language.  We can hold 
whatever private idiosyncratic meaning of words we may wish in our 
minds, but unless we disclose our idiosyncratic meanings to others—or the 
communicative context suggests otherwise—the words we choose to use 
will convey the conventional meaning that ordinarily attaches to these 
words.  So “yes” ordinarily means yes to a normal speaker of English, and 
“no” means no, despite our secret desire or wish that “yes” means no, or 
perhaps even that “yes” means yellow. 
 
the time of origin by the conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases in the con-
text that was shared by the drafters, ratifiers, and citizens.”). 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; 
and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be 
convened) against domestic Violence.”). 
 14. Although some “constitutional abolitionists,” such as Lysander Spooner, argued to 
the contrary, most others, like Salmon P. Chase, accepted the contextual evidence of original 
public meaning. See Randy E. Barnett, From Antislavery Lawyer to Chief Justice:  The Re-
markable but Forgotten Career of Salmon P. Chase, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 653 (2013); 
Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One?  The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 3 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 165 (2011). 
 15. It was Solum’s seminal work on “semantic originalism” that first made this point so 
clearly. See Solum, supra note 5. 
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This is important to keep in mind because the empirical nature of the in-
quiry entails that it can potentially be resolved by appeals to evidence.  This 
is not to say that the objective meaning of words is always discoverable.  
Sometimes there are ambiguities in linguistic usage that cannot be resolved.  
Yet if language is to work, this is likely to be a relatively rare occurrence.  
And, more importantly, when confronting conflicting interpretive claims 
about meaning, there is (á la Gertrude Stein) a there there potentially to re-
solve the conflict. 
When faced with whether “domestic violence” in Article IV refers to ri-
ots or spousal abuse, or whether the word “arms” in the Second Amend-
ment refers to weapons or the limbs to which our hands are attached, we are 
making a claim about reality, not merely a statement of our normative pref-
erences.  This is the reason why so much of the Constitution, such as how 
many senators are allotted to each state, is so uncontroversial.  The objec-
tive original public meaning of what Sanford Levinson has called the “hard-
wired” parts of the Constitution is simply so clear that its meaning can rare-
ly even be questioned.16 
Given the empirical nature of ascertaining original public meaning, the 
New Originalism ought to be practiced more rigorously than the old 
originalism.  Historians, for example, were often critical of originalist 
scholarship for “cherry-picking” quotes to support one’s views—for exam-
ple, “I say Madison said X, you say Hamilton said Y,” now what?  Some 
antioriginalist historians also objected that intentions are just too hard to 
identify with enough specificity to resolve a current case or controversy, 
though this has not prevented these same nonoriginalist historians from fil-
ing amicus briefs asserting their own opinions about the original intentions 
behind, say, the right to keep and bear arms or the power to regulate com-
merce among the several states. 
In contrast, establishing the semantic meaning of the words in the text, 
given the publicly available context, requires a survey of relevant usage.  
The search for original public meaning should be as systematic and com-
prehensive as possible with respect to any source one surveys, reporting de-
viant as well as predominate usage.  For example, in my article on the orig-
inal meaning of the Commerce Clause in the University of Chicago Law 
Review,17 I surveyed every use of the term “commerce” at the Philadelphia 
Convention, in the Federalist Papers, and in the ratification debates.  Then, 
in a sequel in the Arkansas Law Review,18 I added a comprehensive survey 
of all 1,500-plus uses of the term “commerce” in the Pennsylvania Gazette 
over an eighty-five year period.  I found that, contrary to my expectation, 
usage of the word “commerce” was remarkably uniform. 
 
 16. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION:  WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 107–08 (2008). 
 17. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 101 (2001). 
 18. See Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce 
Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003). 
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We are searching for an empirical fact:  what information would these 
words on the page have conveyed to the reasonable speaker of English in 
the relevant audience at the time of enactment?  In this inquiry, the linguis-
tic usage by opponents as well as proponents of the Constitution is relevant, 
as are even private letters. 
C.  Originalism’s Normative Claim:  We Should Follow Original Meaning 
Third, having stressed that the original public meaning is an empirically 
objective fact, I now acknowledge that the New Originalism does also 
make a normative claim, and it is this:  the original meaning of the text pro-
vides the law that legal decisionmakers are bound by or ought to follow.  
This is a normative and not a description claim, which then poses the ques-
tion:  just why should we follow the communicative content of the Consti-
tution at the time of its enactment? 
New Originalists do not all give the same answer to this question,19 so let 
me briefly summarize mine.  I start with the proposition that the Constitu-
tion was put in writing so it could provide the law that governs those who 
govern us.  A written constitution cannot serve this purpose if the very peo-
ple who are to be governed by it can themselves, alone or in combination, 
alter the meaning of the constraints imposed upon them.  None of us can al-
ter the meaning of the statutes or regulations imposed upon us without go-
ing through the amendment process, and neither can our rulers, who are 
supposed to be our agents. 
As John Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison: 
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits 
may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.  To what 
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation com-
mitted to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those in-
tended to be restrained?20 
But you don’t have to take John Marshall’s or my word on the subject.  
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution in Article VI provides that “This 
Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”21  For present pur-
poses, of greatest importance is the reference to “[t]his Constitution.”  This 
is a direct reproach to those who think that “the Constitution” is a broader 
concept, which may or may not include the text of the written Constitution.  
No, the Constitution that is the supreme law of the land is this one, the writ-
 
 19. Keith Whittington, for example, grounds his commitment to original meaning on 
popular sovereignty. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 110–59 (1999).  My own 
views on popular sovereignty have evolved as I discovered the concept of individual popular 
sovereignty that existed at the time of the Founding. See Randy E. Barnett, The People or the 
State? Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1179 (2007).  As I in-
tend to explain in the future, I now think that popular sovereignty is entirely consistent with 
grounding the normative basis for originalism on the protection of natural rights. 
 20. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
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ten one, not a constitution provided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
The Supremacy Clause expressly says that “the judges in every state 
shall be bound thereby,” which means that the text of the Constitution is the 
“law of the land” that binds state courts that, under the original Constitu-
tion, were the only lower courts to consider federal question cases unless 
and until Congress established inferior federal courts.22  Article VI goes on 
to say more about who is bound by “this Constitution”:  “The Senators and 
Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State 
Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United 
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to 
support this Constitution.”23 
So this Constitution is the law that governs those who govern us.  And 
this Constitution cannot serve this purpose of governing those who are sup-
posed to be governed by it—including federal and state judges—if they can, 
on their own, change the rules that apply to them. 
Indeed, one succinct way to define the New Originalism is the proposi-
tion noted above:  that the express and implied public meaning of the words 
on the page should remain the same until properly changed.  And the prop-
er way to change “this Constitution” is provided in Article V.  Judges are 
not allowed to update the text of the Constitution by changing the meaning 
it had at the time of enactment. 
Let me conclude this section by noting that, to the extent we are engaging 
in a normative debate about how we ought to interpret the Constitution, the 
burden of persuasion does not rest solely on originalists.  Nonoriginalists 
should also be able to articulate how they think “this Constitution” should 
be interpreted and why.  For example, just why do they think we are stuck 
with two Senators per state, notwithstanding that so much has changed 
since the Founding, including views of democracy and the need for one 
man, one vote.  On their theory of interpretation, why can’t judges just up-
date the number of Senators each state gets?  To paraphrase what comedian 
Jeff Foxworthy says about rednecks,24 when a nonoriginalist undertakes to 
answer this question seriously, in the end, he or she just might be a New 
Originalist. 
D.  The Limits of Originalism:  Interpretation v. Construction 
Having insisted that the meaning of “this Constitution” is the publicly 
available meaning at the time of enactment, I wish now to stress that the 
New Originalism is then far more modest than the old originalism about the 
amount of information actually conveyed by the words on the page—even 
when broadened to include publicly available context and constitutional 
 
 22. Id. (emphasis added). 
 23. Id. (emphasis added). 
 24. See JEFF FOXWORTHY, YOU MIGHT BE A REDNECK IF . . . (Warner Bros. Records 
1993). 
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implicature.  The New Originalism takes seriously the distinction between 
ambiguity and vagueness of language.25 
Language is ambiguous when it has more than one sense.  When one says 
“this feather is light,” one might be referring to its weight or one might be 
referring to its color.  But, unless one is being poetic, one does not ordinari-
ly mean both at the same time.  In contrast, language is vague insofar as it 
has a core meaning that is clear, but it has a penumbral meaning where it 
may not be clear whether or not it applies to a particular object.  So, a white 
feather is clearly a light feather, and a black feather is clearly not.  But how 
dark a shade of grey a feather must be before we cease calling it light and 
start calling it dark is not always clear.26 
The New Originalism claims that, except for some special cases, ambigu-
ity can usually be resolved by reference to evidence of context.  So context 
makes clear that “arms” in the Second Amendment refers to weapons, not 
the limbs to which our hands are attached, and “domestic violence” refers to 
riots, not spousal abuse.  With respect to vagueness, however, the original 
meaning of the text can run out—by which I mean, the text simply does not 
specify whether a particular item is in or out—for example, whether a par-
ticular search is “reasonable” or a particular punishment is “cruel.” 
When original meaning runs out, constitutional “interpretation,” strictly 
speaking, is over, and some new noninterpretive activity must supplement 
the information revealed by interpretation.  New Originalists refer to this 
activity as “constitutional construction,” as distinct from “constitutional in-
terpretation,”27 but it does not matter what labels one applies to distinguish 
these two activities so long as we recognize that they are two different ac-
tivities. 
For present purposes, the most important thing to note about constitu-
tional construction is that, although the activity of construction is con-
strained by the original meaning of the text, construction is needed precise-
ly when that communicative meaning is not sufficiently determinate to 
dictate a unique application.  For this reason, extra guidance must be sup-
plied by some nonoriginalist methodology. 
By adopting the interpretation-construction distinction, the New 
Originalism frankly acknowledges that the text of “this Constitution” does 
not provide definitive answers to all cases and controversies that come be-
fore Congress or the courts.  In this sense, the Framers and ratifiers of the 
Constitution locked some things into their text, and delegated other matters 
to future decisionmakers.  While the Constitution is the law that governs 
those who govern us, we all know constraining government officials was 
not its only purpose; the Constitution was enacted also to empower them.  
The vague terms in the Constitution empower legislatures and judges to put 
 
 25. This section summarizes the analysis presented in RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING 
THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89–130 (2004). 
 26. See E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 
953–56 (1967) (distinguishing linguistic ambiguity from vagueness). 
 27. This distinction and terminology was first introduced into the discussion of 
originalism by Keith Whittington. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 19, at 6–7. 
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flesh on the bones of the text, provided they don’t break any of the bones.  
For example, although the Constitution says nothing about “time, place, and 
manner” regulations of speech, this body of constructed doctrine is an effort 
to flesh out the contours of the rights of freedom of speech, press, and as-
sembly.  Devising doctrine to effectuate what this Constitution says does 
not violate a judge’s oath—it fulfills it. 
Because the New Originalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation, 
how constitutional construction is to be conducted is beyond the scope of 
originalism, except to note that a construction is improper if it contradicts 
or undercuts what this Constitution does say.  So originalists can and do 
disagree on how extra-originalist constitutional construction is to be done.  
This disagreement is often informed by what they think makes a constitu-
tion legitimate and binding.  Thus, those who rest constitutional legitimacy 
on the “consent of the governed” might take one approach to construction, 
while those who, like me, rest constitutional legitimacy on effectively pro-
tecting the rights retained by the people, might take another. 
But, this open-endedness notwithstanding, I want to stress that the New 
Originalism still has bite.  Despite the fact that the original meaning of the 
text may sometimes or even often be “underdeterminate,” this does not en-
tail that it is wholly indeterminate.  The recent dispute between “living 
originalist” Jack Balkin and me about the meaning of “commerce” in the 
Commerce Clause illustrates that it matters a great deal whether the original 
meaning of “commerce” was the trade or transportation of persons and 
things from one place to another, as I believe the evidence shows, or “social 
interaction,” as Balkin contends.28  And the fact that Balkin and I may disa-
gree does not refute the claim that there was a fact of the matter we are 
seeking to establish by resorting to evidence of usage.  To repeat, with the 
New Originalism, there is a there there.  Interested third parties can read my 
articles, then read Balkin’s, then read my critique of his use and omission of 
evidence, and then read his reply.  They can then reach their own conclu-
sions about who is right. 
II.  THE GRAVITATIONAL FORCE OF ORIGINALISM 
Of course, the New Originalism has developed a lot in the past fifteen 
years, and continues to develop further.  My goal in Part I was to provide a 
concise and accessible overview of the current state of the theory.  But to 
this some may respond, “So what?”  Courts pay very little attention to orig-
inal meaning, it might be said, and even the conservatives on the Supreme 
Court seem little inclined to discuss it, much less adhere to it.  One response 
to this reaction is simply that it is far too court or litigation centric; one’s 
view of constitutional interpretation should not be so dependent on what 
judges may or may not think, or how they write their opinions.  Originalism 
 
 28. Compare JACK BALKIN, LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 138–82 (2011) (claiming that 
“commerce” originally meant “interaction” at the time of enactment), with Randy E. Barnett, 
Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce,” 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 623 (denying that 
“commerce” meant “interaction” at the time of enactment). 
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claims to be the right way to read the Constitution for whoever cares to read 
the Constitution accurately, be they legislators, judges, or citizens.  If courts 
do not adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution when they should, 
then originalism serves the important purpose of providing a basis for nor-
matively critiquing their failure. 
In this Part, however, I want to address this challenge on its own terms 
by explaining why originalism does matter to courts and in litigation.  My 
point is simple and stems from the description of the New Originalism that I 
provided in Part I.  Originalism matters when lower courts, but especially 
when the Supreme Court, are engaged in constitutional interpretation, 
properly limited to discussing the meaning of the text of the Constitution. 
One reason why this seems rare is that in 99.9 percent of constitutional 
cases the courts are not engaged in constitutional interpretation, but are, in-
stead, engaged in interpreting the meaning—perhaps even the original 
meaning—of their previous decisions or doctrines.  In other words, because 
courts are engaged in constitutional construction in 99.9 percent of constitu-
tional cases, they pay little heed to the text and how it should best be inter-
preted. 
Once one understands the descriptive distinction between the activities of 
interpretation and construction and acknowledges that originalism is only a 
method of interpretation, it becomes easy to see why the criticism that 
originalism is generally ignored by courts is very wide of the mark.  When 
courts, and especially the Supreme Court, are engaged in interpretation 
strictly speaking, originalism assumes center stage. 
In this Part, I also discuss how and why originalism influences the out-
come of cases in which it appears to be playing no role—cases such as the 
constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act (ACA).29  I suggest that 
originalism has a kind of “gravitational force” that affects legal doctrine in 
significant ways, or at least that this force can affect such doctrine even 
when the original meaning of the Constitution appears not to be the basis of 
a judicial decision, provided there are justices who accept the relevance of 
originalism. 
A.  Writing on a Blank Slate:  District of Columbia v. Heller 
Consider District of Columbia v. Heller.30  Prior to Heller, the Supreme 
Court had discussed the meaning of the Second Amendment at any length 
just once before—in the ambiguous 1939 case of Miller v. United States.31  
So, when the Supreme Court finally decided to take up the issue in Heller, 
 
 29. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 30. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 31. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).  Although I believe that Miller was entirely consistent with 
interpreting the original meaning of the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right 
to arms, gun control proponents managed to sow enough doubt over the meaning of this 
opinion that we might consider it to be ambiguous.  Indeed, until the 2001 case of United 
States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), every federal appellate court found that 
Miller had adopted a collective rights reading of the amendment. E.g., Hickman v. Block, 81 
F.3d 98, 102 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976). 
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there was no precedent that clearly dictated the result.  Consequently, the 
justices were effectively writing on a clean slate.  Moreover, since the 
1980s, a substantial body of scholarship has developed examining the origi-
nal meaning of the Amendment, and the politics of the Second Amendment 
were such that the Court could reach either decision without bringing down 
the pillars of the temple. 
Thus, the default position of the justices was to decide on the basis of the 
original meaning of the Second Amendment.  The five in the majority ex-
plicitly adopted an “original public meaning” approach to the text, carefully 
parsing the sentence clause by clause and word by word.  “In interpreting 
this text,” wrote Justice Scalia, “we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he 
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and 
phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from tech-
nical meaning.’”32  He then made it clear that “[n]ormal meaning may of 
course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical 
meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the found-
ing generation.”33 
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion was more ambiguous.  On the one 
hand, he attempted to refute the original public meaning analysis of Justice 
Scalia.34  Yet Justice Stevens also affirmatively appealed to original Fram-
ers’ intent.35  Ironically, most of the historians and law professors who filed 
briefs on behalf of the government based their arguments on original Fram-
ers’ intent, seemingly oblivious to the powerful left-critique of this version 
of originalism in the 1980s that led to its abandonment by most 
originalists.36  Apparently not really understanding the original public 
meaning approach, or the interpretation-construction distinction, their 
originalist analysis, along with that of Justice Stevens, was unresponsive to 
the New Originalist analysis of the majority. 
This was reminiscent of the old joke about how not to plead in the alter-
native in criminal cases:  “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, my client who 
sits here before you did not commit this crime; someone else did it.  But if 
he did commit it, he was insane at the time.”  So, originalism is to be reject-
ed because it is a fool’s errand to reconstruct the collective intentions of 
those who framed, or perhaps those who ratified, the original Constitution, 
much less the Congress who proposed the Second Amendment and the state 
 
 32. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 
(1931)). 
 33. Id. at 576–77; see also id. at 614 (observing that the post–Civil War debates “do not 
provide as much insight into its original meaning as earlier sources”); id. at 625 (“We con-
clude that nothing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original understanding of 
the Second Amendment.”). 
 34. See, e.g., id. at 649 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The stand-alone phrase ‘bear arms’ 
most naturally conveys a military meaning unless the addition of a qualifying phrase signals 
that a different meaning is intended.”). 
 35. See id. at 667 n.33 (“What is striking about the Court’s discussion is its failure to 
refute Oliver’s description of the meaning of the Amendment or the intent of its draft-
ers . . . .”). 
 36. See, e.g., Brief for Jack N. Rakove et al. As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 
1, Heller, 554 U.S. at 570 (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157183, at *1. 
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legislators who voted to ratify it.  But, as it happens, historians can offer 
their expert scholarly opinions that the right protected was a collective right 
of states to have a militia, an individual right to bear arms in a militia, etc. 
Heller represents a clear case of the “gravitational force” of 
originalism.37  Not only did the five justices in the majority join Justice 
Scalia’s explicitly originalist opinion, but Justice Stevens never disputed 
that this was an appropriate basis to decide the case.  He merely purported 
to disagree with the originalist conclusions of the majority.  Though a bit 
more equivocal, Justice Breyer joined the opinion of Justice Stevens, and 
purported to supplement it with an analysis of the proper scrutiny to be used 
to evaluate gun laws.38 
This is not to say that Justice Scalia’s opinion was without any flaws 
from an originalist perspective.  While his textual analysis was pretty state 
of the art, he then qualified his conclusion in a much-noted passage: 
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of 
the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should 
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.39 
I agree that this passage is unsatisfactory.  Why exactly are these laws all 
right under the original meaning of the Amendment?  It just seems ad hoc. 
Without delving too deeply into this specific issue, let me offer the fol-
lowing diagnosis of the problem.  For all the importance of his role in de-
veloping and promoting original public meaning originalism, Justice Scalia 
simply has not internalized the distinction between interpretation and con-
struction.  Indeed, he recently made clear his objection to making such a 
distinction.40 
But this stance creates a problem for him.  Because he has only one tool 
in his toolbox—original public meaning interpretation—he is forced to try 
to identify the contours of the original public meaning of the individual 
right to arms so it excludes these and other laws.41  Such a move is appro-
 
 37. By “gravitational force,” I am not making a Dworkinian claim about the analytic 
force or pull of legal reasoning. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 121 
(1977) (“If [Hercules] classifies some event as a mistake, then he does not deny its specific 
authority but he does deny its gravitational force, and he cannot consistently appeal to that 
force in other arguments.”).  Instead, I am making a sociocultural claim about the influence 
of originalist interpretation on even nonoriginalist doctrinal construction.  But the ideas are 
similar. 
 38. Justice Breyer’s approach in dissent has been well received by lower courts, which 
will necessitate a return engagement to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. 
Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 39. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 40. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 14–15 (2012).  For a response, see Solum, supra note 12, at 483–88. 
 41. Alternatively, he can rely on stare decisis. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The 
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989) (“[A]lmost every originalist would adulter-
ate it with the doctrine of stare decisis . . . .”).  For my criticism of this approach, see Randy 
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priate if, and only if, the evidence supports a conclusion that the original 
public meaning of a term or phrase was so limited.  But the overwhelming 
evidence that the original meaning of the right to keep and bear arms was of 
the same individualistic nature as the individual rights of speech, press, and 
assembly,42 is simply inadequate to draw such lines. 
As with the First Amendment’s protection of the freedom of speech, the 
proper approach to this problem is to identify the right, in this case the indi-
vidual’s right to possess and carry weapons, including firearms.  This will 
lead to the conclusion that complete bans on firearms in common use for 
individual and collective self-defense are unconstitutional, and likely other 
conclusions as well.  But then one must acknowledge that, like the right of 
freedom of speech, this protected liberty—like all liberties—may be rea-
sonably regulated, provided that such regulations do not unduly burden the 
right or serve as a mere pretext for restricting its exercise.  The way this was 
done historically was to realistically assess regulations of liberty to see if 
they were irrational, arbitrary, or discriminatory.43 
Because we are dealing with a fundamental right, we cannot accept the 
legislature’s word, or even its good faith, as we do under the approach of 
modern “rational basis” scrutiny.  A more realistic assessment is required.  
So when considering, for example, the constitutionality of bans on so-called 
military-style assault weapons, or restrictions on the capacity of magazines, 
courts should ask, at minimum, whether these or other measures are actual-
ly rational by requiring legislatures to articulate the end they are seeking to 
accomplish, and then assess whether the means adopted actually match the 
purported end.  Would these bans actually have prevented a mass shooting 
or ameliorated real crimes? 
This heightened “rationality review” could help ensure that the reason be-
ing articulated is the real reason for the law.  For example, “assault weap-
ons” are a made-up category of weapons that is based solely on cosmetic 
features that make them look like the fully automatic weapons used by the 
military.44  Banning them leaves completely legal other rifles that are func-
tionally identical in their lethality and rate of fire.  Moreover, far more 
 
E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity:  A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 7 (2006). 
 42. See Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right To Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Ser-
vice in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237 (2004) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER 
& WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002)). 
 43. See Randy E. Barnett, Keynote Remarks:  Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of 
Lee Optical, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV 845 (2012) (describing how traditional police power 
scrutiny was done). 
 44. David B. Kopel, Rational Basis Analysis of “Assault Weapon” Prohibition, 20 J. 
CONTEMP. L. 381, 417 (1994) (“The classification of ‘assault weapons’ is not based on dif-
ferences that are real in fact.  The banned firearms do not fire faster than many guns that are 
not banned.  The banned firearms do not have a larger ammunition capacity than many guns 
that are not banned. . . .  All the other physical characteristics of ‘assault weapons’ which 
might form a rational basis for prohibiting them are simply not valid (such as claims about 
ammunition lethality), are trivial (such as bayonet lugs), or make the gun more accurate 
(such as a muzzle brakes).”). 
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powerful hunting rifles and shotguns are left untouched by the law.  This is 
simply irrational and, therefore, unconstitutional. 
Deciding on the appropriate kind and degree of scrutiny of laws purport-
ing to reasonably regulate the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right 
is a matter not of interpretation, but of construction.  Whether the exemp-
tions listed by Justice Scalia are actually reasonable or rational follows from 
the constructions the Court adopts to protect the abstract rights that are 
identified by the original meaning of the text. 
B.  Contending with Precedent:  McDonald v. City of Chicago 
In Heller, the Court was writing on a relatively clean slate.  Only a single 
case, Miller, had any bearing on the meaning of the text of the Second 
Amendment.  By contrast, when the Court was called upon to decide 
whether the individual right to keep and bear arms applied to the states, the 
Court needed to confront whether to reverse a precedent of long-standing 
vintage:  the Slaughter-House Cases,45 which had greatly limited the scope 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Be-
cause of this and other nineteenth-century cases, when the Court later de-
cided to apply most of the rights contained in the first ten amendments to 
the states, it did so via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, rather than the Privileges or Immunities Clause.46 
For example, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,47 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether the individual right to keep and bear arms 
(that it had identified in Heller) applied to the states as well.  There is a 
widespread academic consensus that the original meaning of the “privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States” included at least the personal 
guarantees enumerated in the first eight amendments, especially the right to 
keep and bear arms.48  Thus the justices who believed that the individual 
right to bear arms applied to the states faced a choice:  whether to expressly 
adhere to the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, or 
apply its later doctrine incorporating those rights deeply rooted in the tradi-
tion and history of the American people into the Due Process Clause.  Alt-
hough the petitioners, supported by amici,49 urged the Court to utilize the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, a plurality of four justices, including the 
self-described originalist Justice Scalia, opted to follow precedent rather 
than original meaning and applied the doctrine of substantive due process.50 
 
 45. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
 46. See, e.g., Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) 
(“The legislature may prescribe a form of procedure to be observed in the taking of private 
property for public use, but it is not due process of law if provision be not made for compen-
sation.”). 
 47. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 48. No one has been more influential in generating this consensus than Michael Kent 
Curtis. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:  THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986). 
 49. See, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Law Professors As Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners at 1, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4099504, at *1. 
 50. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31. 
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Nevertheless, McDonald illustrates the gravitational force of originalism.  
For one thing, the key fifth vote, provided by Justice Clarence Thomas, was 
entirely based on original meaning.51  Justice Thomas refused to join the 
precedent-based plurality opinion.  Secondly, as Justice Thomas demon-
strated, the conclusion reached by the plurality was entirely consistent with 
the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  McDonald is 
not, therefore, a case where a majority of the Court was willing to contra-
dict the original meaning of the text by relying on stare decisis.  Thirdly, 
Justice Alito’s plurality opinion for the Court did not reject originalism, but 
instead asserted its agnosticism: 
The municipal respondents and some of their amici . . . contend that the 
phrase ‘privileges or immunities’ is not naturally read to mean the rights 
set out in the first eight Amendments . . . .  A number of scholars have 
found support for the total incorporation of the Bill of Rights. . . .  We 
take no position with respect to this academic debate.52 
For these three reasons, although the plurality in McDonald did not choose 
to decide the case on the basis of original meaning, that meaning could be 
said to have exerted a gravitational force on the outcome. 
In one important respect, however, the plurality’s decision did represent a 
fear of adhering to original meaning.  At oral argument, it became clear that 
members of the plurality were concerned about the implications of the orig-
inal meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  In particular, they 
were apparently concerned that the scope of this meaning might include the 
protection of some unenumerated rights.  For example, during rebuttal, Jus-
tice Alito asked pointedly whether the original meaning of “privileges or 
immunities” included “the right to contract”—a not-so-subtle reference to 
the liberty of contract protected by the Court in Lochner v. New York.53 
That the plurality was willing to stick with its substantive due process 
precedent can be explained by its belief that it had sufficiently limited, in-
deed neutered, that doctrine with the approach it followed in Washington v. 
Glucksberg.54  Thus, it was far safer to apply that test to the right to keep 
and bear arms than it was to open a potential can of worms by adhering to 
the original meaning of the text.55  In short, it was precisely because the 
original meaning of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States was both sufficiently definite and objectionable to the members of 
the plurality (as it was to the four dissenters for similar reasons) that the 
plurality decided to stick with precedent. 
 
 51. See id. at 3058–59 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 52. Id. at 3033 n.10 (plurality opinion). 
 53. 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 
3020 (No. 08-1521) (“Well, does it include the right to contract? . . .  Isn’t that an 
unenumerated right?”). 
 54. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 55. For my critique of this approach to protecting fundamental rights, see Randy E. Bar-
nett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479 (2008) (describing and criticizing the 
“Glucksberg Two-Step”). 
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Still, as was noted above, the plurality could not bring itself to repudiate 
original meaning and, indeed, relied upon it at crucial parts of its opinion.  
It did so, however, by bowdlerizing its sources to read that the right to bear 
arms was protected by the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
as a whole, rather than by the Privileges or Immunities Clause in particular.  
For example, Justice Alito wrote that “Senator Jacob Howard, who spoke 
on behalf of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and sponsored the 
Amendment in the Senate, stated that the Amendment protected all of ‘the 
personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the 
Constitution.’”56  In fact, in this speech, Senator Howard was expressly ex-
plaining the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the proposed 
amendment:  “To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be—
for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise 
nature—to these should be added the personal rights guarantied and secured 
by the first eight amendments of the Constitution.”57 
Likewise, Justice Alito wrote that “Representative John Bingham, the 
principal author of the text of § 1, said that the Amendment would ‘arm the 
Congress . . . with the power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the 
Constitution today.’”58  Like Howard, however, Bingham was explaining 
the meaning of “privileges or immunities.”  Indeed, when he made the 
statement quoted by Justice Alito on February 28, Bingham was defending 
a precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment that read:  “The Congress shall 
have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure 
to the citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several states. . . .”59 
But this sort of fainthearted originalism is nothing new.  Indeed, the term 
“fainthearted originalist” was coined by Justice Scalia himself in an article 
in which he identified not just one, but several circumstances in which he 
would abstain from following original meaning.60  And Justice Scalia was 
not alone in this regard.  Many originalist scholars claim that precedent, or 
stare decisis, should trump original meaning under certain circumstances. 
While I am on record disagreeing with Justice Scalia,61 and with those 
who would allow stare decisis to trump originalism,62 this is a debate within 
originalism and among originalists. 
 
 56. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3033 n.9 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 
(1866)) (emphasis added). 
 57. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2765. 
 58. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3033 n.9 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 
1088) (emphasis added). 
 59. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1088. 
 60. See Scalia, supra note 41. 
 61. See Barnett, supra note 41. 
 62. See Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent:  A Reply to 
Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232 (2006); Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Prece-
dent with Original Meaning:  Not As Radical As It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257 
(2005). 
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C.  Originalism in the Background:  National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius 
I was one of the lawyers representing the National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business in its constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act 
in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).  Previ-
ously, the Cato Institute and I had filed amicus briefs in all the other major 
challenges to the ACA.  We did not assert the original meaning of the 
Commerce or Necessary and Proper Clauses as a basis for the decision in 
the case in any of the briefs to which I was a party.  Nor did we contest the 
constitutionality of the various mandates that the Act imposed on insurance 
companies, despite my own belief that the ACA’s regulation of insurance 
contracts exceeded the original meaning of these congressional powers.63  
We did not do so because we believed that the Court would have considered 
itself bound by its 1944 precedent in United States v. South-Eastern Un-
derwriters Ass’n,64 in which it held that contracts for insurance could be 
regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause.65 
Instead, we contended that the assertion of a power to compel individuals 
to engage in economic activity, so that Congress may then regulate it, was 
unprecedented and, therefore, was unjustified by existing precedents.  And 
we argued that the individual insurance mandate was an improper means for 
Congress to execute its commerce power over insurance companies.  Given 
that original meaning was not even asserted by the parties, it is no surprise 
that the opinions of both Chief Justice John Roberts and the four dissenting 
justices did not rely on original meaning per se.  Instead, these five justices 
accepted our contention that the power to mandate economic activity was 
unprecedented, and that it did not fall under the Commerce Clause or the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Rather than assert and rely upon original meaning, these justices stuck 
with the New Federalism of the Rehnquist Court, or what my colleague 
Lawrence Solum has dubbed a “constitutional gestalt.”66  The New Federal-
ism of the Rehnquist Court did not question the existence of what law pro-
fessors call “the New Deal Settlement.”  It did reject, however, the prevail-
ing constitutional gestalt among law professors that the New Deal and 
Warren Courts “settled” that Congress has a plenary power over the nation-
al economy, subject only to whatever express prohibitions are found in the 
Constitution and, perhaps, some additional unenumerated fundamental 
rights.  Or, put another way, that the Commerce and Necessary and Proper 
Clauses together amount to a “National Problems Power” in Congress. 
In contrast, according to the Rehnquist Court, although all the powers 
that were approved by the New Deal and Warren Courts are now to be tak-
 
 63. See Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People:  Why the Individual Health In-
surance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 583–87 (2010) (discuss-
ing the original meaning of the Commerce Clause). 
 64. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
 65. See generally id. 
 66. See Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 
91 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2152653. 
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en as constitutional and are to be upheld as “settled” precedents, any claim 
of additional new powers still needs to be justified.  In other words, the ex-
pansion of congressional power authorized by the New Deal and Warren 
Courts established a new high-water mark of constitutional power.  Going 
any higher than this requires special justification. 
This constitutional gestalt can be summarized as “this far and no far-
ther”—provided “no farther” is not taken as an absolute but merely as es-
tablishing a baseline beyond which serious justification is needed.67  As 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist observed in United States v. Morrison,68 
“thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause 
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in na-
ture.”69  This is why the general acceptance of our claim that the individual 
insurance mandate was unprecedented was so crucial to the unexpected le-
gal success we enjoyed.  Accepting our claim that the mandate was unprec-
edented placed the burden of justification on the government. 
This brings me to a second tenet of the constitutional gestalt of the New 
Federalism:  any purported justification that would lead to an unlimited 
reading of Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers would improperly contra-
dict what, in United States v. Lopez,70 Chief Justice Rehnquist identified as 
the “first principles” of our constitutional law.  In what has become a fa-
mous passage, he wrote: 
We start with first principles.  The Constitution creates a Federal Gov-
ernment of enumerated powers.  As James Madison wrote:  “The powers 
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few 
and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State governments are nu-
merous and indefinite.” . . .  This constitutionally mandated division of 
authority “was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our funda-
mental liberties. . . .  Just as the separation and independence of the coor-
dinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumu-
lation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power 
between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of 
tyranny and abuse from either front.”71 
This is why the claim by the government and many law professors that 
“health care is a national problem” and other similar rationales fell on five 
deaf ears.  All these rationales, if accepted, would lead to a national police 
power qualified only by the Bill of Rights (as are state police powers).  And 
this was contrary to the constitutional gestalt of the Rehnquist Court’s New 
Federalism. 
 
 67. For a similar assessment of the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism, see John 
Valauri, Baffled by Inactivity:  The Individual Mandate and the Commerce Power, 10 GEO. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 63 (2012) (describing the “‘thus far’ method and justification of con-
stitutional line drawing”). 
 68. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 69. Id. at 613 (emphasis added). 
 70. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 71. Id. at 552 (citations omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison), and 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)). 
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As I explain elsewhere,72 I believe the reason why so many law profes-
sors missed the boat on how the claims would be decided is that many have 
not appreciated this alternative reading of the New Deal settlement adopted 
by the Rehnquist Court.  Because of this, these professors think that the on-
ly alternative to their constitutional gestalt is a return to the pre–New Deal 
gestalt of holding Congress to the original meaning of its powers under Ar-
ticle I, Section 8, a course they are properly confident there are not five 
votes to take. 
Others have rationalized the distinction in Lopez and Morrison between 
“economic” and “noneconomic” activity as identifying the outer boundary 
of the plenary power over national economic regulation.73  In other words, 
they have internalized this distinction within their constitutional gestalt.  
They read Lopez and Morrison as generally consistent with the preexisting 
view of the New Deal settlement. 
Still others may have thought that whatever alternative gestalt was im-
plicit in the New Federalism was abandoned by the Court in Gonzales v. 
Raich,74 when Justices Kennedy and Scalia voted to uphold the Controlled 
Substances Act.75  Moreover, two of the three justices in the dissent in 
Raich had been replaced by justices with little or no preexisting commit-
ment to finding any limits on the enumerated powers of Congress, leaving 
only Justice Thomas open to the argument that the individual mandate ex-
ceeded the powers of Congress. 
If you held any of these views, the challenge to the individual insurance 
mandate was an easy case for you.  After all, the ACA was a comprehensive 
scheme to regulate the national economy.  The individual insurance man-
date was easily characterized as “necessary” to this scheme and not in con-
flict with any express prohibition of the Constitution.  End of story.  More-
over, anyone who suggested anything to the contrary was advocating the 
undoing of the New Deal settlement and a return to the old pre–New Deal 
constitutional gestalt of the evil Lochner era, for which there were not five 
votes on the Court. 
All of this missed, first, the possibility that the Rehnquist Court’s New 
Federalism represented an alternate constitutional gestalt of “this far and no 
farther” without a justification that would not undermine the enumerated 
powers scheme and, second, that there might still be five justices on the 
Court who subscribed to this gestalt. 
Assuming you accept my description of the Rehnquist Court’s constitu-
tional gestalt, however, you may well object:  Why this far and no farther?  
Why draw the line at this point?  Isn’t this arbitrary?  Besides, where is all 
 
 72. See Randy E. Barnett, No Mean Feat:  Who Won the Health Care Case (and Why 
Did So Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331 (2013). 
 73. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism:  A General 
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 131 (2010) (“[T]he Court has ostensibly 
placed decisive emphasis on its determination of whether the activity regulated by Congress 
is ‘economic’ or ‘noneconomic’ in nature, which also appears to determine whether that ac-
tivity exists ‘among the several States’ or instead is internal to one state.”). 
 74. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 75. See generally id. 
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this in the Constitution?  Law professors said the same thing about the eco-
nomic-noneconomic activity line the Court drew in Lopez.  Why draw that 
line?  Where is that line in the text of the Constitution? 
Here is where I think the growth of originalism since the 1980s enters the 
picture.  Unlike the Heller case, which was argued and decided on 
originalist grounds, we made no originalist claims whatsoever in our chal-
lenge to the ACA.  The original meaning of the Constitution still played a 
role, however, because it lies behind the Rehnquist Court’s New Federal-
ism, exerting a gravitational force that we can see now extends to the Rob-
erts Court too. 
Simply put, the role played by originalism is this:  during the New Deal 
era, Americans acquiesced to an enormous expansion of federal power, and 
the Supreme Court eventually expanded its interpretation of federal power 
accordingly.  This expansion is now generally considered by the Court to be 
settled precedent.  But with respect to the Article I, Section 8 powers of 
Congress, the powers upheld by the New Deal and Warren Courts violated 
the original meaning of the Constitution, and this expansion was, therefore, 
illegitimate on originalist grounds.  Because of this, any further expansion 
must be justified, and any purported justification that would essentially 
eliminate the enumerated powers scheme in the original Constitution is un-
acceptable or improper. 
Until NFIB, we could not be certain whether the Raich case represented a 
repudiation of the “this far and no farther” approach of the New Federalism 
(though I believed there were strong hints in both United States v. Com-
stock76 and Bond v. United States77 that a majority had not abandoned the 
constitutional gestalt of the Rehnquist Court).  NFIB is significant, there-
fore, because it shows that the Rehnquist Court’s constitutional gestalt of 
“this far and no farther” still has five votes in the Roberts Court.  And this is 
due, I believe, at least in part to the gravitational force of originalism, a 
force that can affect even constitutional decisions and doctrines that are not 
expressly justified on the basis of original public meaning. 
CONCLUSION 
The claim that originalism exerts a gravitational force on the Supreme 
Court’s doctrine is obviously contestable.  Other explanations of the doc-
trines and decisions I have discussed are possible.  And, even if true, I am 
hardly claiming that originalism’s gravitational force is irresistible.  Obvi-
ously, it was not strong enough to reverse either the Slaughter-House Cases 
or South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, much less United States v. Darby,78 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,79 or Wickard v. Filburn,80 although 
it might well have been powerful enough to keep even the New Deal Court 
 
 76. 560 U.S. 126 (2010). 
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from expressly adopting the view that Congress has a plenary power over 
the “national economy” or a National Problems Power.81  After all, though 
the gravitational force of the sun is not strong enough to cause the Earth to 
plunge into its fiery depths, it is still powerful enough to keep the Earth in 
its orbit. 
Of course, the gravitational force of originalism is dependent in part on 
the current composition of the Court.  A lot will depend on future retire-
ments, future elections, and the future intellectual debates over the proper 
method of constitutional interpretation.  If another Justice Breyer replaces 
one of the more conservative five, we can expect that gravitational force to 
diminish greatly.  But I would not expect it to disappear altogether.  
Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has rarely repudiated original 
meaning expressly.  Perhaps the closest it came to this was in Home Build-
ing & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell.82  Pledging adherence to the original mean-
ing of the text, as Justice Stevens did in Heller, while allowing other con-
siderations like precedent to take priority, as Justice Scalia did in 
McDonald, is the homage that vice pays to virtue.  Even that is a force to be 
reckoned with. 
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